Trà Mi-VOA
Thứ Sáu, 25 tháng 5 2012
Ngoại trưởng Hoa Kỳ Hillary Clinton, ngày 24/5, trình Quốc hội Mỹ bản Báo
cáo về tình hình nhân quyền thế giới năm 2011, trong đó có nêu lên thực trạng
nhân quyền tại Việt Nam.
Phúc trình của Bộ Ngoại giao Hoa Kỳ nhận xét rằng các vi phạm nhân quyền chính yếu nhất tại Việt Nam bao gồm những giới hạn chặt chẽ của nhà nước về quyền chính trị của công dân nhất là quyền thay đổi chính thể, việc gia tăng các biện pháp hạn chế quyền tự do dân sự, và tình trạng tham nhũng trong hệ thống tư pháp cũng như bộ máy công an.
Báo cáo nêu rõ các vi phạm cụ thể về quyền con người tại Việt Nam từ tình trạng công an ngược đãi tù nhân, giam cầm tùy tiện những người hoạt động chính trị, cho tới việc khước từ quyền được xét xử công bằng của công dân.
Phúc trình cũng nói rằng hệ thống tư pháp Việt Nam bị bóp méo bởi quyền thế chính trị và tham nhũng.
Vẫn theo bản báo cáo của Bộ Ngoại giao Mỹ, Việt Nam vẫn tiếp tục sách nhiễu tôn giáo, tăng cường đàn áp những tiếng nói bất đồng chính kiến và gia tăng kiểm duyệt internet với việc tấn công các trang mạng và theo dõi các trang blog, và vẫn cấm không cho các tổ chức bảo vệ nhân quyền độc lập được hoạt động.
Báo cáo cho thấy nạn bạo lực và phân biệt đối xử với phụ nữ cũng như buôn người tại Việt Nam vẫn tồn tại cùng với tình trạng khai thác tình dục trẻ em và phân biệt đối xử về giới tính cũng như với những người bị nhiễm HIV/AIDS.
Ngoài ra, phúc trình của Bộ Ngoại giao Mỹ cũng cho rằng chính quyền Việt Nam giới hạn quyền của công nhân không cho phép họ thành lập và tham gia các công đoàn độc lập không thuộc nhà nước.
Báo cáo của Bộ Ngoại giao Mỹ được đưa ra trong lúc giới chức Hoa Kỳ bày tỏ quan ngại về tình hình nhân quyền xuống cấp tại Việt Nam.
Mới đầu tháng, nhân ngày Tự do Báo chí Thế giới 3/5, Tổng thống Hoa Kỳ kêu gọi thế giới đừng quên trường hợp bị giam cầm của blogger Điếu Cày tại Việt Nam vì các hoạt động thực thi quyền tự do ngôn luận, tự do bày tỏ ý kiến.
Giữa tháng này, trong cuộc điều trần về tình hình nhân quyền Việt Nam tại Quốc hội Mỹ do Ủy ban Nhân quyền Tom Lantos của Hạ Viện tổ chức, Trợ lý Ngoại trưởng Mỹ đặc trách Dân chủ, Nhân quyền, và Lao động, ông Michal Posner nêu rõ thực trạng vi phạm nhân quyền tại Việt Nam gây phương hại cho quan hệ chiến lược Việt-Mỹ.
Phúc trình của Bộ Ngoại giao Hoa Kỳ nhận xét rằng các vi phạm nhân quyền chính yếu nhất tại Việt Nam bao gồm những giới hạn chặt chẽ của nhà nước về quyền chính trị của công dân nhất là quyền thay đổi chính thể, việc gia tăng các biện pháp hạn chế quyền tự do dân sự, và tình trạng tham nhũng trong hệ thống tư pháp cũng như bộ máy công an.
Báo cáo nêu rõ các vi phạm cụ thể về quyền con người tại Việt Nam từ tình trạng công an ngược đãi tù nhân, giam cầm tùy tiện những người hoạt động chính trị, cho tới việc khước từ quyền được xét xử công bằng của công dân.
Phúc trình cũng nói rằng hệ thống tư pháp Việt Nam bị bóp méo bởi quyền thế chính trị và tham nhũng.
Vẫn theo bản báo cáo của Bộ Ngoại giao Mỹ, Việt Nam vẫn tiếp tục sách nhiễu tôn giáo, tăng cường đàn áp những tiếng nói bất đồng chính kiến và gia tăng kiểm duyệt internet với việc tấn công các trang mạng và theo dõi các trang blog, và vẫn cấm không cho các tổ chức bảo vệ nhân quyền độc lập được hoạt động.
Báo cáo cho thấy nạn bạo lực và phân biệt đối xử với phụ nữ cũng như buôn người tại Việt Nam vẫn tồn tại cùng với tình trạng khai thác tình dục trẻ em và phân biệt đối xử về giới tính cũng như với những người bị nhiễm HIV/AIDS.
Ngoài ra, phúc trình của Bộ Ngoại giao Mỹ cũng cho rằng chính quyền Việt Nam giới hạn quyền của công nhân không cho phép họ thành lập và tham gia các công đoàn độc lập không thuộc nhà nước.
Báo cáo của Bộ Ngoại giao Mỹ được đưa ra trong lúc giới chức Hoa Kỳ bày tỏ quan ngại về tình hình nhân quyền xuống cấp tại Việt Nam.
Mới đầu tháng, nhân ngày Tự do Báo chí Thế giới 3/5, Tổng thống Hoa Kỳ kêu gọi thế giới đừng quên trường hợp bị giam cầm của blogger Điếu Cày tại Việt Nam vì các hoạt động thực thi quyền tự do ngôn luận, tự do bày tỏ ý kiến.
Giữa tháng này, trong cuộc điều trần về tình hình nhân quyền Việt Nam tại Quốc hội Mỹ do Ủy ban Nhân quyền Tom Lantos của Hạ Viện tổ chức, Trợ lý Ngoại trưởng Mỹ đặc trách Dân chủ, Nhân quyền, và Lao động, ông Michal Posner nêu rõ thực trạng vi phạm nhân quyền tại Việt Nam gây phương hại cho quan hệ chiến lược Việt-Mỹ.
Ông Posner nhấn mạnh:
“Chúng tôi vẫn thấy tình hình nhân quyền tại Việt Nam không có gì khích lệ và không thể chấp nhận được. Các giới chức trong chính phủ Mỹ tiếp tục nêu các vấn đề này với Việt Nam trong các cuộc đối thoại nhân quyền với Hà Nội. Chúng tôi nêu rõ với Việt Nam rằng mong muốn của đôi bên về mối quan hệ chiến lược chặt chẽ hơn giữa hai nứơc Việt-Mỹ tùy thuộc vào việc Hà Nội có cải thiện đáng kể về nhân quyền hay không.”
Phúc trình thường niên của Bộ Ngọai giao Hoa Kỳ nhằm báo cáo những thông tin ghi nhận cho các nhà lập pháp Mỹ và cung cấp thông tin tham khảo cho các chính phủ, các tổ chức quốc tế cũng như các tổ chức phi chính phủ về tình hình nhân quyền các nước trên thế giới.
“Chúng tôi vẫn thấy tình hình nhân quyền tại Việt Nam không có gì khích lệ và không thể chấp nhận được. Các giới chức trong chính phủ Mỹ tiếp tục nêu các vấn đề này với Việt Nam trong các cuộc đối thoại nhân quyền với Hà Nội. Chúng tôi nêu rõ với Việt Nam rằng mong muốn của đôi bên về mối quan hệ chiến lược chặt chẽ hơn giữa hai nứơc Việt-Mỹ tùy thuộc vào việc Hà Nội có cải thiện đáng kể về nhân quyền hay không.”
Phúc trình thường niên của Bộ Ngọai giao Hoa Kỳ nhằm báo cáo những thông tin ghi nhận cho các nhà lập pháp Mỹ và cung cấp thông tin tham khảo cho các chính phủ, các tổ chức quốc tế cũng như các tổ chức phi chính phủ về tình hình nhân quyền các nước trên thế giới.
-----------------------------------
Toàn
bộ bản phúc trình về tình hình nhân quyền thế giới năm 2011 :
Về Việt Nam
Vietnam
To
link directly to this report, use: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186319
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The
Socialist Republic of Vietnam is an authoritarian state ruled by a single
party, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) led by General Secretary Nguyen Phu
Trong, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, and President Truong Tan Sang. The most
recent National Assembly elections, held in May, were neither free nor fair,
since the CPV’s Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), an umbrella group that monitors
the country’s mass organizations, vetted all candidates. Security forces
reported to civilian authorities.
The
most significant human rights problems in the country were severe government
restrictions on citizens’ political rights, particularly their right to change
their government; increased measures to limit citizens’ civil liberties; and
corruption in the judicial system and police.
Specific
human rights abuses included continued police mistreatment of suspects during
arrest and detention, including the use of lethal force, as well as austere
prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and detention for political activities, and
denial of the right to fair and expeditious trial. Political influence, endemic
corruption, and inefficiency strongly distorted the judicial system. The
government increasingly limited privacy rights and freedoms of the press,
speech, assembly, movement, and association; increasingly suppressed dissent;
further restricted Internet freedom; reportedly was involved in attacks against
critical Web sites; and spied on dissident bloggers. Freedom of religion
continued to be subject to uneven interpretation and protection, with
significant problems continuing, especially at provincial and village levels.
Police corruption persisted at various levels. The government maintained its
prohibition of independent human rights organizations. Violence and
discrimination against women as well as trafficking in persons continued, as
did sexual exploitation of children and some societal discrimination based on
ethnicity, sexual orientation and gender identity, and HIV/AIDS status. The
government limited workers’ rights to form and join independent unions and
inadequately enforced safe and healthy working conditions.
The
government inconsistently took steps to prosecute and punish officials who
committed abuses, and members of the police sometimes acted with impunity.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of
the Person, Including Freedom from:Share
a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
There
were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or
unlawful killings, but there were reports of 19 deaths of persons in custody
during the year as well as abuses of lethal force.
For
example, in March Trinh Xuan Tung died in custody in Hanoi after Lieutenant
Colonel Nguyen Van Ninh beat him while in detention for a traffic violation.
Authorities suspended Ninh pending investigation, and at year’s end the
scheduling of a trial was expected in early 2012.
In
April in Dong Nai Province, local police officers beat Nguyen Cong Nhut to
death after detaining him for five days for allegedly stealing tires. The case
was reported to the Supreme People’s Court and at year’s end remained under
investigation.
In
March a court convicted police officer Nguyen The Nghiep of excessive use of
force and sentenced him to seven years in prison for the death by beating of Nguyen
Van Khuong, who was arrested for a traffic violation in Bac Giang Province in
July 2010. Authorities also banned Nghiep for life from the police force and ordered
him to pay 155 million Vietnamese dong (VND) (approximately $7,380) to the
deceased’s family, which his family did.
In
September authorities charged four former prison guards (Hoang Dinh Nam, Nguyen
Van Tho, Le Huu Thiet, and Tran Van Phuc) in the Central Highlands with using
plastic batons to beat to death inmate Truong Thanh Tuan in September 2010. A
court directed the four to pay VND 129 million (approximately $6,140) to the
victim’s family.
b. Disappearance
There
were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.
There
continued to be no information on the whereabouts of Thich Tri Khai, a monk
from the unregistered Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam whom authorities
arrested in 2008, and Le Tri Tue, a founder of the Independent Workers’ Union
whom authorities placed in custody in 2007.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
The
law prohibits physical abuse, but police commonly mistreated suspects during
arrest or detention. Incidents of physical harassment, intimidation, and the
questioning of family members were reported in several locations, including but
not limited to Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Bac Giang and Dong Nai provinces.
For
example, in April local police arrested and beat Tran Van Du from Soc Trang
Province while interrogating him in custody. In October the Soc Trang People’s
Court sentenced the following police officers for “intentionally inflicting
injury”: Vo Van Ut Deo to two years’ imprisonment; Danh Nhan, eight years; Tran
Tuan Khai, four years; and Nguyen Quoc Thang, two years.
In
August Hanoi police officials opened an investigation into an alleged
“deliberate physical assault” by police Captain Minh after Internet footage
showed him stomping on a detained protester during a demonstration over Chinese
sovereignty claims in the South China Sea (East Sea) in July. Authorities
placed Minh on administrative leave but later cleared and reinstated him.
Land-rights
protesters in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Danang, and several provinces in the
Mekong Delta continued to report instances of physical harassment and
intimidation by local authorities. Most incidents between local authorities and
ethnic minorities involved land, money, or domestic disputes. For example, the
People’s Court of Gia Lai Province convicted nine Montagnards of “undermining
unity policy” and sentenced them to prison for what human rights groups
reported were advocacy activities related to Montagnard rights or land
disputes. The sentences handed down in April were as follows: Siu Hlom, 12
years; Siu Nheo and Siu Brom, 10 years each; Rah Lan Mlih, Ro Mah Pro, and Rah
Lan Blom, nine years each; and Kpa Sin and Ro Man Klit, eight years each. In
December the court also sentenced Siu Thai (Ama Thuong), arrested in April, to
10 years’ imprisonment.
The
government reported in September that more than 32,300 drug users--the large
majority of whom were administratively sentenced to forced detoxification
without judicial review--were living in the 121 drug-detention centers
countrywide. According to the government, the stated population did not exceed
the intended capacity of the centers, which had separate facilities for women.
At these centers, according to a September report from a nongovernmental
organization (NGO), authorities allegedly forced individuals to perform menial
work under harsh conditions and mistreated them (see section 7.b.). After his
November visit, the UN special rapporteur on health criticized these centers as
ineffective and counterproductive.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Prison
conditions were austere but generally not life threatening. Overcrowding,
insufficient diet, lack of access to potable water, and poor sanitation
remained serious problems. Prisoners generally were required to work but
received no wages. Authorities sometimes placed prisoners in solitary
confinement, thus depriving them of reading and writing materials for periods
of up to several months. Family members continued to make credible claims that
prisoners received benefits by paying bribes to prison officials or undertaking
hunger strikes.
Prisoners
had access to basic health care, although in many cases officials prevented
family members from providing medication to prisoners. Family members of
imprisoned activists who experienced health problems claimed medical treatment
was inadequate and resulted in greater long-term health complications. In July
and September, respectively, two long-term prisoners convicted and jailed for
attempting to overthrow the government (Nguyen Van Trai, a member of the
People’s Action Party of Vietnam, and Truong Van Suong) died in prison from
liver cancer and heart disease, respectively.
The
total number of prisoners and detainees was not publicly available. Pretrial
detainees were held separately from convicted prisoners. Juveniles generally
were held in prison separately from adults, but on rare occasions, they were
held in detention with adults for short periods due to the unavailability of
space. Men and women were held separately but treated equally. Political prisoners
were typically sent to specially designated prisons that also held other
regular criminals, and in most cases, political prisoners were kept separate
from nonpolitical prisoners. Authorities completely isolated some high-profile
political prisoners from all others. While prison sentences could be extremely
lengthy, prisoners were not forced to serve beyond the maximum sentence for
their charged offense.
Authorities
limited prisoners to one 30-minute family visit per month and generally
permitted family members to give supplemental food and bedding to prisoners.
Prisoners did not have the right to practice their religion in public, nor to
have access to religious books and scriptures, although authorities allowed
Roman Catholic priest and democracy activist Thaddeus Nguyen Van Ly (rearrested
in July) to keep a Bible, pray, and give communion. Prisoners were allowed to
submit complaints to prison management and judicial authorities, but their
complaints were routinely ignored.
Previously,
authorities had permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit
prisons, but no such visits occurred during the year. Authorities allowed
foreign diplomats to make one limited prison visit and meet with a prominent
prisoner. State control of the media restricted reporting on living conditions.
There were no prison ombudsmen, and no individuals were allowed to serve on
behalf of prisoners and detainees to consider such matters as alternatives to
incarceration for nonviolent offenders.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The
law allows the government to detain persons without charges indefinitely under
vague “national security” provisions. The government also arrested and
indefinitely detained individuals under other legal provisions and subjected
several dissidents throughout the country to administrative detention or house
arrest.
Role of the Police and Security Apparatus
Internal
security is the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Security, although in
some remote areas, the military is the primary government agency and performs
public safety functions, including maintaining public order in the event of
civil unrest. The ministry controls the police, a special national security
investigative agency, and other internal security units. It also maintains a
system of household registration and block wardens to monitor the population.
While this system was less intrusive than in the past, it continued to monitor
individuals suspected of engaging, or being likely to engage, in unauthorized
political activities. Credible reports suggested that local police used
“contract thugs” and “citizen brigades” to harass and beat political activists
and others, including religious worshippers, perceived as undesirable or a
threat to public security.
Police
organizations exist at the provincial, district, and local levels and are
subject to the authority of people’s committees at each level. At the commune
level, it is common for guard forces composed of residents to assist the
police. The police were generally effective at maintaining public order, but
police capabilities, especially investigative, were generally very limited, and
training and resources were inadequate. Several foreign governments assisted in
training provincial police and prison management officials to improve their
professionalism.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention
The
law outlines the process by which individuals are taken into custody and
treated until authorities adjudicate their cases. The Supreme People’s
Procuracy (Public Prosecutor’s Office) issues arrest warrants, generally at the
request of police. However, police may make an arrest without a warrant based
on a complaint filed by any person. The procuracy issues retroactive warrants
in such cases. The procuracy must issue a decision to initiate a formal
criminal investigation of a detainee within nine days; otherwise, police must
release the suspect. In practice the nine-day regulation was often
circumvented.
Arbitrary
Arrest: Arbitrary
arrest and detention, particularly for political activists, remained a problem.
According to activist groups and diplomatic sources, the government sentenced
at least 29 arrested activists during the year to a total of 165 years in jail
and 70 years of probation for exercising their rights. Authorities also
increasingly charged political dissidents with “attempting to overthrow the
state” due to their alleged membership in political parties other than the CPV.
While violators of this legal provision had the possibility of receiving the
death penalty, they typically received prison sentences of up to seven years.
The government also used decrees, ordinances, and other measures to detain
activists for the peaceful expression of opposing political views (see section
2.a.).
For
example, in February police in Ho Chi Minh City detained Nguyen Dan Que for
allegedly urging individuals to take part in mass protests demanding political
reforms but released him after three days of questioning. Local police
continued to monitor him closely throughout the year.
In
April police detained political dissidents Pham Hong Son and Le Quoc Quan for
“causing public disorder” in an attempt to attend the open trial of fellow
political activist Cu Huy Ha Vu but released them nine days later.
Peaceful
protests during the year in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi over Chinese sovereignty
claims in the South China Sea (East Sea) resulted in the temporary detention
and surveillance of several protest organizers, and there were reports that
local security officials prevented individuals from leaving their homes to take
part in the demonstrations. Moreover, on November 27, authorities detained
activist Bui Thi Minh Hang in Ho Chi Minh City for participating in one such
“illegal” protest and previously participating in related protests in July and
August in Hanoi. In December authorities sentenced her without due process to
two years at a reeducation camp near Hanoi.
Authorities
also subjected religious and political activists to varying degrees of informal
detention in their residences. For example, Ho Chi Minh City local police
continued to monitor prominent activists Nguyen Dan Que and Do Nam Hai closely.
Pretrial
Detention:
The investigative period typically lasted from three months for less serious
offenses (punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment) to 16 months for
exceptionally serious offenses (punishable by more than 15 years’ imprisonment
or capital punishment) or more than two years for national security cases.
However, at times investigations lasted indefinitely. By law the procuracy may
also request additional two-month periods of detention after an investigation
to consider whether to prosecute a detainee or ask police to investigate
further. Investigators sometimes used physical abuse, isolation, excessively
lengthy interrogation sessions, and sleep deprivation to compel detainees to
confess.
By
law detainees are permitted access to lawyers from the time of their detention;
however, authorities used bureaucratic delays to deny access to legal counsel.
In cases investigated under national security laws, authorities prohibited
defense lawyers’ access to clients until after an investigation had ended and
the suspect had been formally charged with a crime, most often after
approximately four months. Under regulations, investigations may be continued
and access to counsel denied for more than two years. In addition a scarcity of
trained lawyers and insufficient protection of defendant rights made prompt
detainee access to an attorney rare. In practice only juveniles and persons
formally charged with capital crimes were assigned lawyers.
Attorneys
must be informed of and allowed to attend interrogations of their clients.
However, a defendant first must request the presence of a lawyer, and it was
unclear whether authorities always informed defendants of this right. Attorneys
also must be given access to case files and be permitted to make copies of
documents. Attorneys were sometimes able to exercise these rights.
Police
generally informed families of detainees’ whereabouts, but family members could
visit a detainee only with the permission of the investigator, and this
permission was not regularly granted. During the investigative period,
authorities routinely denied detainees access to family members, especially in
national security cases. Before a formal indictment, detainees also have the
right to notify family members, although a number of detainees suspected of
national security violations were held incommunicado. There is no functioning
bail system or equivalent system of conditional release. Time spent in pretrial
detention counts toward time served upon conviction and sentencing.
Courts
may sentence persons to administrative detention of up to five years after
completion of a sentence. In addition police or mass organizations can propose
that one of five “administrative measures” be imposed by people’s committee
chairpersons at district and provincial levels without a trial. The measures
include terms ranging from six to 24 months in either juvenile reformatories or
adult detention centers and generally were applied to repeat offenders with a
record of minor offenses, such as committing petty theft or “humiliating other
persons.” Terms of 24 months were standard for drug users and prostitutes.
Individuals sentenced to detention facilities were forced to meet work quotas
to pay for services and detention costs. Chairpersons may also impose terms of
“administrative probation,” which generally took the form of restriction on
movement and travel. Authorities continued to punish some individuals using
vaguely worded national security provisions of the law.
Amnesty: In honor of
National Day, the government amnestied approximately 10,535 prisoners on August
29, the overwhelming majority of whom had ordinary criminal convictions. Among
those released were the following five individuals convicted of committing
national security crimes: three ethnic Montagnards from Dak Lak Province (Y
Dhiam Eban, Y Bien Nie, and Y Kim Kbuor) charged with “undermining national
unity,” as well as Nguyen Van Tinh from Haiphong and Tran Duc Thach from Nghe
An Province, both charged with antistate propagandizing.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The
law provides for the independence of judges and lay assessors, but in practice
they were not independent. The CPV controlled the courts at all levels through
its effective control over judicial appointments and other mechanisms, and in
many cases it determined verdicts. As in past years, political influence,
endemic corruption, and inefficiency strongly distorted the judicial system.
Most, if not all, judges were members of the CPV and chosen at least in part
for their political views. The party’s influence was particularly notable in
high-profile cases and other instances in which authorities charged a person
with challenging or harming the party or state.
There
continued to be a shortage of trained lawyers and judges. The Vietnam Bar
Federation falls under the supervision of the VFF and is closely coordinated
with the Ministry of Justice and the Vietnam Lawyers Association. The federation,
which oversees local bar association functions, continued during the year to
develop a professional code of conduct for lawyers.
Trial Procedures
The
constitution provides that citizens are innocent until proven guilty, although
many lawyers complained that judges generally presumed guilt. Trials generally
were open to the public, but in sensitive cases judges closed trials or
strictly limited attendance. Juries are not used.
The
public prosecutor brings charges against an accused person and serves as
prosecutor during trials. Defendants have the right to be present and have a
lawyer at trial, although not necessarily the lawyer of their choice, and this
right was generally upheld in practice. Defendants unable to afford a lawyer
generally were provided one only in cases involving a juvenile offender or with
possible sentences of life imprisonment or capital punishment. The defendant or
defense lawyer has the right to cross-examine witnesses, but there were cases
in which neither defendants nor their lawyers were allowed to have access to
government evidence in advance of the trial, cross-examine witnesses, or
challenge statements. Defense lawyers commonly had little time before trials to
examine evidence against their clients. In national security cases, judges
occasionally silenced defense lawyers who were making arguments on behalf of
their clients in court because the judges deemed the arguments reactionary.
Convicted persons have the right to appeal. District and provincial courts did
not publish their proceedings, but the Supreme People’s Court continued to
publish the proceedings of all cases it reviewed.
There
continued to be credible reports that authorities pressured defense lawyers not
to take as clients any religious or democracy activists facing trial. Human
rights lawyers were restricted, harassed, arrested, disbarred, and in some
cases detained for representing political activists. For example, on August 12,
the Dak Lak Bar Association dismissed Huynh Van Dong for serving as a defense lawyer
in May for two defendants charged with subversive acts against the state.
Additionally, given their previous convictions, lawyers Le Tran Luat, Le Thi
Cong Nhan, and Le Quoc Quan were not permitted to practice law. During the
April trial of activist Cu Huy Ha Vu, one of his attorneys (Tran Vu Hai)
accused the Hanoi People’s Court of violating criminal procedure by refusing to
publicize the documents by which the court made its accusation. When the court
refused to drop the charges and declare a mistrial, activist Vu sent his
lawyers away in protest; the court found him guilty and sentenced him to seven
years in prison.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
There
continued to be no precise estimates of the number of political prisoners. The
government reportedly held more than 100 political detainees at year’s end,
although some international observers claimed there were more (see also section
1.d., Arbitrary Arrest). Diplomatic sources reported the existence of four
reeducation centers in the country holding approximately 4,000 prisoners.
For
example, on February 8, authorities arrested Vu Quang Thuan, democracy activist
and chairperson of the Vietnam Restoration Movement, upon arrival at Tan Son
Nhat airport in Ho Chi Minh City for propagandizing against the state. He
awaited trial at year’s end.
On
December 23, authorities arrested and detained Viet Khang (also known as Vo
Minh Tri) after he composed and sang two songs to express his view on the
government’s handling of the dispute with China regarding sovereignty in the
South China Sea (East Sea). At year’s end his detention reportedly continued in
Ho Chi Minh City.
At
year’s end dissident Nguyen Ba Dang, a member of the People’s Democratic Party,
awaited trial. Police had arrested him in January 2010 in Hai Duong Province
for distributing antistate propaganda.
In
March the Tra Vinh Province Appeals Court upheld the original sentences of
three members of the United Workers-Farmers Organization--nine years’
imprisonment for Nguyen Hoang Quoc Hung and seven years’ imprisonment for Do
Thi Minh Hanh and Doan Huy Chuong--whose convictions were for causing public
disorder to oppose the government. Police had arrested them for distributing
pamphlets in February 2010 that called on citizens to advocate for democracy and
freedom of assembly and to fight attempted invasions from China.
In
September the Dong Nai Province People’s Court sentenced Pham Thi Phuong, a
member of the Vietnam Populist Party, to 11 years in prison for activities to
overthrow the government. Authorities had arrested her and her husband, Pham Ba
Huy, in Ho Chi Minh City in April 2010 for reportedly planning a campaign to
bomb statues throughout the city. At year’s end Pham Ba Huy continued to await
trial.
In
January Binh Phuoc People’s Court convicted Phung Lam from Binh Phuoc Province
of propagandizing against the state and sentenced him to seven years in prison.
Police had arrested him in June 2010 for alleged ties to the Democratic Party
of Vietnam (DPV) and DPV chairman Nguyen Sy Binh, claiming that Lam posted
articles opposing the government on the Internet. Lam had fled to Cambodia in
May 2010, but police arrested him when he attempted to return to visit his
family.
During
a one-day closed trial in May, the Ben Tre People’s Court convicted several
defendants of attempting to overthrow the government and sentenced them as
follows: Tran Thi Thuy from Dong Thap Province, eight years’ imprisonment and
five years’ probation; Pham Van Thong, Ben Tre Province, seven years’
imprisonment and five years’ probation; Pastor Duong Kim Khai, Ho Chi Minh
City, six years’ imprisonment and five years’ probation; and Cao Van Tinh, Con
Tho Province, five years’ imprisonment and five years’ probation. The other
three (congregant Pham Ngoc Hoa, Nguyen Thanh Tam, and lay pastor Nguyen Chi
Thanh) were each sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and three years’
probation. In August Thuy, Thong, Khai, and Tinh appealed; the court reduced
Khai’s sentence to five years’ imprisonment and Tinh’s sentence to four years’
imprisonment, and denied the appeals of Thuy and Thong. Police had arrested
Thuy, Thong, Khai, and Tam in July-August 2010 for alleged ties to a banned,
foreign-based, prodemocracy group and for organizing and advocating on behalf
of land-rights claimants in Ben Tre and Dong Thap provinces. Police had also
arrested Hoa and Thanh, affiliated with Khai and the unrecognized Mennonite
Church, in November 2010 for their alleged ties to the same prodemocracy group
and their work with Khai.
On
March 22, authorities deported foreign citizen Le Kin, whom they had arrested
in October 2010 in Ho Chi Minh City for attempting to overthrow the government
through his alleged involvement with overseas political organizations critical
of the government.
In
August an appeals court upheld the Hanoi People’s Court sentence in April of
attorney Cu Huy Ha Vu to seven years in jail for antistate propagandizing.
Police had arrested him in November 2010 for his Internet articles and
interviews with foreign media criticizing the prime minister. In November Vu’s
appeal of his sentence was unsuccessful.
In
February the Hanoi People’s Court convicted Vu Duc Trung and Le Van Thanh,
affiliated with the Falun Gong movement, of “illegally broadcasting information
[into China] and operating information networks without a license” and
sentenced them to three and two years’ imprisonment, respectively. Police had
arrested them in Hanoi in November 2010 for broadcasting Falun Gong radio
programs.
In
March the People’s Court of Tri Ton District, An Giang Province, sentenced Chau
Heng, a Khmer Krom land-rights activist to two years’ imprisonment for
“deliberately destroying property and creating social disorder.” Police had
arrested Heng in December 2010 as he reentered Vietnam after being denied
political refugee status by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) in Thailand. Heng had led protests in 2007 and 2008 against local
government land seizures.
Also
in August the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Court sentenced Pham Minh Hoang, a dual
national and professor at the Ho Chi Minh City University of Technology, to
three years’ imprisonment followed by three years’ house arrest for alleged
ties to a foreign-based prodemocracy group, posting critical comments online
against the government under a pseudonym in 2010, and activities aimed at
overthrowing the government. Hoang admitted guilt and asked to return to a
foreign country. An appeals court in Ho Chi Minh City in November reduced the
imprisonment from three years to 17 months, and Hoang continued to serve his
sentence at year’s end.
In
March the appellate division of the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Court reduced Le
Thang Long’s original sentence from five years’ imprisonment to
three-and-a-half years. In May the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Court denied the
appeal of businessman and blogger Tran Huynh Duy Thuc and upheld his original
sentence of 16 years’ imprisonment. Long and Thuc--as well as prominent
attorney Le Cong Dinh and DPV leader and Viet Youth for Democracy cofounder
Nguyen Tien Trung--had all been arrested in 2009 and tried jointly in Ho Chi
Minh City in January 2010 for involvement in a plot to create new political
parties and overthrow the government. Dinh and Trung had pleaded guilty to
joining political parties other than the CPV but had denied attempting to
overthrow the government. During the year there were no developments in the
cases of Dinh and Trung.
On
August 29, the government amnestied and released Bloc 8406 member Tran Duc
Thach (see section 1.d., Amnesty). Authorities had arrested Thach plus Bloc
8406 members Vu Van Hung and Pham Van Troi in 2008, convicted them in 2009 of
antistate propagandizing for displaying banners that criticized the CPV and
advocated multiparty democracy, and sentenced them to prison (Thach and Hung,
three years’ imprisonment; Troi, four years). In January 2010 the Hanoi
Appellate Court--with foreign diplomats and journalists excluded--had upheld
the prison sentences.
In
July authorities returned Roman Catholic priest and activist Thaddeus Nguyen
Van Ly to prison to complete the remainder of his eight-year prison term for
propagandizing against the state. Authorities had arrested him in 2007 in
connection with his role in cofounding the Bloc 8406 movement and the Vietnam
Progressive Party but had granted him a one-year humanitarian release in March
2010 to seek treatment for a brain tumor following two strokes in 2009 (see
also section 1.c.).
Several
other political dissidents affiliated with outlawed political
organizations--including the People’s Democratic Party, People’s Action Party,
Free Vietnam Organization, DPV, United Workers and Farmers Organization, Bloc
8406, and others--remained in prison or under house arrest in various
locations.
Authorities
also continued to detain and imprison other individuals who used the Internet
to publish ideas on human rights, government policies, and political pluralism
(see section 2.a., Internet Freedom).
Authorities
released several persons, including political activists and religious leaders,
during the year, including the following:
In
June authorities released activist and dissident author Tran Khai Thanh Thuy
from prison, and she resettled abroad. A Hanoi court had convicted Thuy and her
husband, Do Ba Tan, in February 2010 of assault and had sentenced her to
three-and-one-half years in prison and him to two years’ probation following a
2009 incident in which unidentified individuals attacked them.
On
July 1, authorities released democracy activist Ngo Quynh, who had been
convicted and imprisoned for antistate propagandizing in 2009.
In
March activist lawyer Nguyen Van Dai completed his 2007 sentence of four years
in prison for posting appeals for a multiparty state on the Internet, and
authorities released him to begin his sentence of four years’ house arrest.
In
September Pham Ba Hai, leader of the Bach Dang Giang Foundation and a Bloc 8406
member, completed his 2006 sentence of five years in prison for antistate
propaganda. At year’s end he was serving two years’ house arrest.
In
February authorities released political activist and former police officer Tran
Van Thieng, age 75. A court in Ho Chi Minh City had convicted him in 1991 of
attempting to overthrow the government by “trying to publish a book that
distorted historical information” about Vietnam and had sentenced him to 20
years’ imprisonment.
In
October 2010 the Can Tho Police Security Investigation Agency and the People’s
Procuracy of Can Tho released Doan Van Chac from any wrongdoing and declined
any further investigation into his case. Police had arrested him in June 2010
after he had evaded arrest since participating as a juvenile in a 1983 campaign
against the government that resulted in the deaths of three officials.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
There
is no clear or effective mechanism for pursuing a civil action to redress or
remedy abuses committed by authorities. Civil suits are heard by
administrative, civil, and criminal courts, all of which follow the same
procedures as in criminal cases and are adjudicated by members of the same body
of judges and lay assessors. All three levels were subject to corruption, lack
of independence, and inexperience.
By
law a citizen seeking to press a complaint regarding a human rights violation
by a civil servant is required first to petition the officer accused of
committing the violation for permission to refer the complaint to the
administrative courts. If a petition is refused, the citizen may refer it to
the officer’s superior. If the officer or his superior agrees to allow the
complaint to be heard, the matter is taken up by the administrative courts. If
the administrative courts agree that the case should be pursued, it is referred
either to the civil courts for suits involving physical injury seeking redress
of less than 20 percent of health-care costs resulting from the alleged abuse,
or to the criminal courts for redress of more than 20 percent of such costs. In
practice this elaborate system of referral and permission ensured that citizens
had little effective recourse to civil or criminal judicial procedures to
remedy human rights abuses, and few legal experts had experience with the
system. The government continued to disallow the use of class action lawsuits
against government ministries, thus limiting land rights petitioners from
sending joint complaints to numerous government agencies.
Property Restitution
A
2009 decree offers compensation, housing, and job training for individuals
displaced by development projects. However, there were widespread complaints,
including from the National Assembly, that compensation was inadequate or
delayed. There were also widespread reports of official corruption and a
general lack of transparency in the government’s process of confiscating land
and moving citizens to make way for infrastructure projects. Some members of
ethnic minority groups in the Central and Northwest Highlands continued to
complain that they had not received proper compensation for land the government
confiscated to develop large-scale, state-owned enterprises.
For
example, in February Pham Thanh Son self-immolated on the sidewalk outside the
Danang City People’s Committee building to protest the confiscation of his
family’s property by local officials and their refusal to hear his appeal.
On
November 3, 50 to 70 police officers tried to remove an “illegal” sign, posted
weeks earlier on the roof of the Thai Ha church in Hanoi, which called on the
government to return land the church once owned. Security officials reportedly
injured one church member while attempting to crash through the front gate. On
December 2, security officials detained 30 parishioners and two clergy members,
including the head Thai Ha priest, after 150-200 parishioners peacefully
protested for the land’s return. By year’s end all detainees were released.
In
January, upon appeal, the Danang City People’s Court commuted the sentences of
all the remaining defendants in a land-rights protest that led to police
clashes with Roman Catholic parishioners in a funeral procession in Con Dau
Village in May 2010 and set them free. Police had arrested six parishioners
accused of starting the altercation and damaging a police vehicle. The court
initially tried them in October 2010 for public disorder and denied three of
them legal representation; four individuals received nine- and 12-month jail
sentences, and the remaining two defendants received suspended sentences.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The
law prohibits such actions, but the government did not respect these
prohibitions in practice. Household registration and block warden systems
existed for the surveillance of all citizens. Authorities focused particular
attention on persons suspected of being involved in unauthorized political or
religious activities.
The
government pursued a population and reproductive health strategy that set a
target average number of children per couple (see section 6, Women).
Forced
entry into homes is not permitted without orders from the public prosecutor,
although security forces seldom followed these procedures and instead asked
permission to enter homes with an implied threat of repercussions for failure
to cooperate. During the year police forcibly entered homes of a number of
prominent dissidents--such as Pham Hong Son, Nguyen Thanh Giang, Le Quoc Quan,
and Le Tran Luat--and removed personal computers, cell phones, and other
material.
Government
authorities continued to open and censor targeted persons’ mail; confiscate
packages and letters; and monitor telephone conversations, e-mail, text
messages, and fax transmissions. The government cut the telephone lines and
interrupted the cell phone and Internet service of a number of political
activists and their family members.
CPV
membership remained a prerequisite to career advancement for all government and
government-linked organizations and businesses. However, economic
diversification continued to make membership in the CPV and CPV-controlled mass
organizations less essential to financial and social advancement.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties,
Including:Share
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Status of Freedom of Speech and Press
Although
the constitution and law provide for freedom of speech, including for members
of the press, the government continued to use broad national security and
antidefamation provisions to restrict these freedoms. The law defines the
crimes of “sabotaging the infrastructure of socialism,” “sowing divisions
between religious and nonreligious people,” and “conducting propaganda against
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” as serious offenses against national
security. It also expressly forbids “taking advantage of democratic freedoms
and rights to violate the interests of the state and social organizations.”
Freedom
of Speech:
The government continued to restrict speech that criticized individual
government leaders; promoted political pluralism or multiparty democracy; or
questioned policies on sensitive matters such as human rights, religious
freedom, or sovereignty disputes with China.
Freedom
of Press:
The CPV, government, and party-controlled mass organizations controlled all
print, broadcast, and electronic media. The government exercised oversight
through the Ministry of Information and Communication, under the overall
guidance of the CPV Propaganda and Education Commission. Private ownership of
any media outlet continued to be prohibited.
Foreign
journalists must be approved by the Foreign Ministry’s press center and based
in Hanoi, with the exception during the year of one correspondent reporting
solely on economic matters who lived in and worked from Ho Chi Minh City while
accredited to Hanoi. Foreign journalists are required to renew their visas
every three to six months. The allowed number of foreign media employees was
limited, and Vietnamese employees working for foreign media are required to
register with the Foreign Ministry.
The
procedure for foreign media outlets to hire local reporters and photographers
and receive accreditation approval continued to be cumbersome. The press center
nominally monitored journalists’ activities and approved, on a case-by-case
basis, requests for interviews, photographs, filming, or travel, which must be
submitted at least five days in advance. Reporters temporarily on assignment in
the country are typically assigned a Foreign Ministry minder--with the cost
paid by the news organization. By law foreign journalists are required to
address all questions to government agencies through the Foreign Ministry,
although this procedure often was ignored in practice. Foreign journalists
noted that they notified authorities about their travel outside Hanoi when it
involved a story that the government would consider sensitive or where the
travel was in an area considered sensitive, such as the Northwest or Central
Highlands.
Violence
and Harassment: During
the year security officials attacked or threatened several journalists
reportedly because of their coverage of sensitive stories. For example, in
February Ho Chi Minh City police detained freelance reporter Ta Phong Tan, a
member of the Free Journalists Club, for 24 hours and allegedly beat him for
writing articles critical of government policies.
In
April police arrested publisher Bui Chat after he returned from overseas where
the NGO International Publishers Association had given him their Freedom to Publish
Award. Police held Chat for four days and later summoned him for further
questioning by security officials. Several days later police detained blogger
Ngo Thanh Tu (also known as Thien Sau) in Ho Chi Minh City, as he tried to
depart on an international flight, and questioned him about his affiliation
with Bui Chat. In June authorities detained Chat overnight in Ho Chi Minh City
and prevented his attendance at a foreign embassy ceremony in Hanoi.
In
August a court sentenced Phan Ha Binh, deputy managing editor of Tien Phong,
to seven years in prison for extortion. Authorities had arrested Binh in
October 2010 and accused him of soliciting a VND 220 million (approximately
$10,500) bribe from a cement company and threatening to write negative
articles.
Multiple
reporters for foreign news organizations reported harassment by security
officials, including threats not to renew their visas if they continued to
publish stories on sensitive topics.
Censorship
or Content Restrictions: The Ministry of Information and Communication and the
Propaganda and Education Commission frequently intervened directly to dictate
or censor a story. More often, however, the party and government maintained
control over media content through pervasive self-censorship, backed by the
threat of dismissal and possible arrest. As long as the government did not deem
their content to have been “sensitive,” authorities permitted some private
investors to operate television channels and news-aggregator Web sites and
publish certain pages in newspapers.
Despite
the continued growth of Internet blogs, the party and government increased
efforts to suppress press freedom, continuing a three-year-old “rectification”
campaign. In February Prime Ministerial Decree Number 2, “Sanctions for
Administrative Violations in Journalism and Publishing” went into effect. It
stipulates fines between VND one million and 42 million (approximately
$50-2,100) for journalists, newspapers, and online media which fail to comply
with broad, vague provisions that require “providing honest domestic and
international news in accordance with the interests of the country and the
people.” The decree--which officials described as “simply an administrative
act”--authorizes branches of the government to impose fines on journalists and
newspapers at any time, based on arbitrary determinations by ministries and
officials at various levels about what constitutes “the interests of the
country and the people.” Article 7 of the decree imposes fines of VND 10.5
million to 21 million ($500-1,000) on journalists who fail to publish their
sources of information and similar fines on journalists and newspapers that
“use documents and materials from organizations and personal letters and
materials from individuals.”
In
January the editor in chief of the Saigon Tiep Thi Web site was forced from his
position following the publication in late 2010 of sensitive articles.
In
February Nguyen Anh Tuan, the founder and editor in chief of the news Web site
VietnamNet--whom the ministry reprimanded in December 2010 for publishing an
international NGO’s annual corruption survey--was pressured to resign.
Authorities also refused to renew the press card issued by the government to
the author of the offending article.
Libel
Laws/National Security:
The law requires journalists to pay monetary damages to individuals or
organizations whose reputations were harmed as a result of reporting, even if
the reports were accurate. Independent observers noted that the law severely
limited investigative reporting. There were some press reports on topics that
generally were considered sensitive, such as the prosecution on corruption
charges of high-ranking CPV and government officials, as well as occasional
criticism of officials and official associations. Nonetheless, the freedom to
criticize the CPV and its senior leadership remained restricted.
Publishing
Restrictions:
Under government regulations the Ministry of Information and Communication has
the authority to revoke licenses for foreign publishers, and each foreign publisher
must reapply annually to maintain its license. Foreign-language editions of
some banned books were sold openly by street peddlers and in shops oriented to
tourists. Foreign-language periodicals were widely available in cities,
although the government occasionally censored articles.
In
October the Ministry of Culture’s state-owned Fine Arts Publishing House
recalled all first-edition copies of Killer with a Festering Head, a
cartoon book by Nguyen Thanh Phong, two weeks after its release. According to
media reports, the ban occurred because government censors deemed some of the
book’s illustrations--which satirized contemporary Vietnamese life and social
issues--to be violent, politically sensitive, or broaching sensitive topics.
Nongovernmental
Impact:
The law limits satellite television access to senior officials, foreigners,
luxury hotels, and the press, but in practice persons throughout the country
were able to access foreign programming via home satellite equipment or cable.
Cable television, including foreign-origin channels, was widely available to
urban-area subscribers. Television providers are required to register with the
Ministry of Information and Communication, and edit and translate foreign
programming before it is broadcast. Regulations stipulate that movies and
programming on science, education, sports, entertainment, and music be
translated in advance and that all news programs (CNN and BBC, for example)
provide brief translations in advance of broadcasting.
Internet Freedom
The
government allows access to the Internet through a limited number of service
providers (ISPs), all of which were state-owned, joint-stock companies.
The
government forbids direct access to the Internet through foreign ISPs, requires
domestic ISPs to store information transmitted on the Internet for at least 15
days, and requires ISPs to provide technical assistance and workspace to public
security agents to allow them to monitor Internet activities. The government
requires cybercafes to register the personal information of their customers and
store records of Internet sites visited by customers. ISP compliance with these
government regulations was unclear. Although citizens enjoyed increasing access
to the Internet, the government monitored e-mail, searched for sensitive key
words, and regulated Internet content. In March the NGO Reporters Without
Borders strongly criticized the government for continued regulation of Internet
content and monitoring of individual use.
City
and provincial authorities issue additional local regulations to control online
access. In compliance, Internet cafes continued to install and use
government-approved software to monitor customers’ online activities. Location
of Internet cafes within 220 yards of a school continued to require a curfew on
operations, and ISPs were obliged to cut online access to Internet cafes
between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m. to curb online gaming.
Ministry
of Information and Communication regulations require Internet companies, social
networking sites, and Web sites that provide information in the areas of
“politics, economics, culture, and society” to continue to register and obtain
a government license before operation.
From
May to July, the blocks on Facebook appeared to weaken, with two of the three
major ISPs allowing access to the site. Subscribers of other ISPs often used
workarounds such as virtual private networks to access the site.
Provisions
of law and regulation, such as the prohibition of antistate propagandizing,
prohibit bloggers from posting material that the government believes would
undermine national security, disclose state secrets, or incite violence or
crimes. Consequently, these provisions prohibit individuals from downloading
and disseminating documents the government deems offensive. Regulations also
require global Internet companies with blogging platforms operating in the
country to report to the government every six months and, if requested, to
provide information about individual bloggers. A number of prominent print and
online news journalists maintained their own professional blogs, several of
which were considered far more controversial than their mainstream writing. In
a few instances, the government fined or punished these individuals for the
content of their blogs.
Authorities
detained and imprisoned dissidents who used the Internet to criticize the
government and publish ideas on human rights and political pluralism. Prime
Ministerial Decree Number 2 heralded an increase in the number of bloggers
arrested for online expression, totaling at least nine individuals during the
year. The majority of bloggers arrested were charged with propagandizing
against the state or attempting to overthrow the government.
For
example, in July police detained Dang Xuan Dieu, Ho Duc Hoa, and Nguyen Van Oai
at Tan Son Nhat airport in Ho Chi Minh City after they returned from Thailand
where they had attended an Internet/blogger training course organized by a
foreign NGO. Police also arrested Redemptorist follower Le Van Son, who also
attended the course, on August 3 in Hanoi. That same day, authorities arrested
three more Roman Catholic bloggers (Tran Huu Duc, Dau Van Duong, and Dang Xuan
Tuong) in Vinh City, Nghe An Province, for participating in the same training.
In September police arrested Ta Phong Tam after she posted an analysis of the
arbitrary nature of Le Van Son’s arrest.
On
August 18, local authorities arrested Nguyen Xuan Anh, Repemptorist member and
resident of Vinh City, and charged him with participating in a banned,
foreign-based, prodemocracy group and attempting to overthrow the government.
By year’s end the Vinh Diocese reported that authorities had arrested 16
individuals (15 Roman Catholics and one Protestant).
On
April 19, authorities dropped an investigation and all charges against Le
Nguyen Huong Tra (also known as Co Gai Do Long) and stated that her behavior
“was less serious than previously thought.” Security officials had accused her
of abusing democratic freedoms and had arrested her in October 2010, nine days
after she had posted commentaries critical of Vice Minister of Public Security
Nguyen Khanh Toan’s son.
On
the day of his scheduled release in October 2010 from a 30-month sentence for
alleged tax evasion, authorities rearrested Nguyen Van Hai (also known as Dieu
Cay) for antistate propagandizing, allegedly based on three-year-old blog
postings. There were unconfirmed reports during the year that he lost his arm
while in custody.
In
January the People’s Court of Lang Son Province convicted Vi Duc Hoi, a former
CPV official from the province, of antistate propagandizing after his online
postings in 2007-09 of prodemocracy articles criticized the CPV. The court
sentenced him to eight years in prison followed by five years’ house arrest
(reduced on appeal in April to five years’ imprisonment and three years’ house
arrest). Hoi, a CPV member beginning in 1980, had been removed from the CPV in
2007 after he authored online articles disparaging corruption in the party.
Web
sites critical of the government that were hosted overseas were continually
targeted throughout the year by distributed denial-of-service attacks. A
majority of the targeted Web sites were news-aggregator sites that regularly
republished postings by high-profile dissidents critical of the government.
Hackers rendered several other Web sites inoperable. In June and July the
popular news portal VietnamNet was hacked multiple times and rendered
inaccessible. An investigation into these attacks continued at year’s end. In
August a botnet attacked a Web site belonging to a foreign-based prodemocracy
group using an estimated 77,000 Internet Protocol addresses located in Vietnam,
which suggested government involvement, according to Access Contested:
Security, Identity, and Resistance in Asian Cyberspace.
Political
dissidents and bloggers routinely reported having their home Internet
connections disconnected on orders from the security services.
The
government used firewalls to block some Web sites that it deemed politically or
culturally inappropriate, including sites operated by overseas Vietnamese
political groups. The government appeared to have lifted most of its
restrictions on access to the Voice of America Web site, although it continued
to block Radio Free Asia most of the time. BBC online in Vietnamese and English
was blocked at times during the year.
The
Ministry of Information and Communication requires owners of domestic Web
sites, including those operated by foreign entities, to register their sites
with the government and submit their planned content and scope to the government
for approval. Enforcement remained selective.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
The
government asserted the right to restrict academic freedom, and authorities
sometimes questioned and monitored foreign field researchers. Foreign academic
professionals temporarily working at universities in the country were allowed
to discuss nonpolitical topics widely and freely in classes, but government
observers regularly attended classes taught by both foreigners and nationals.
Academic publications usually reflected the views of the CPV and government.
In
May the National Assembly distributed a draft law on higher education for
public comment. Critics publicly voiced concerns that the draft included an
extensive list of administrative constraints but did not provide universities
with autonomy to make basic decisions, such as what to teach and how many
students to admit.
The
government continued to restrict the ability of some international and domestic
organizations to host conferences with international sponsorship or
participation by requiring government approval at least 20 days in advance.
The
government continued to prohibit independent scientific and technical
organizations from publicly criticizing party and state policy. In July Thai
Nguyen Medical University permanently dismissed Tu Anh Tu, a medical student,
for engaging in activities advocating for democracy, which included reading
online prodemocracy articles and participating in activist movements.
Although
the government controlled art exhibits, music, and other cultural activities,
artists were allowed broader latitude than in past years to choose themes for
their works. The government also allowed universities more autonomy over
international exchanges and cooperation programs.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Freedom of Assembly
The
law limits freedom of assembly, and the government restricted and monitored all
forms of public protest or gathering. Law and regulation require persons
wishing to gather in a group to apply for a permit, which local authorities may
issue or deny arbitrarily. In practice only those arranging publicized
gatherings to discuss sensitive matters appeared to require permits, and
persons routinely gathered in informal groups without government interference.
The government generally did not permit demonstrations that could be seen to
have a political purpose. The government also restricted the right of several
unregistered religious groups to gather in worship.
On
June 5, approximately 300 individuals gathered in front of the Chinese embassy
in Hanoi to protest news reports that Chinese patrol ships harassed a
Vietnamese seismic survey ship and Chinese violations of Vietnamese sovereignty
continued in the disputed South China Sea (East Sea). More than 1,000 individuals
joined a similar protest in Ho Chi Minh City. Similar public demonstrations
took place once a week for 11 consecutive weeks in Hanoi but were censored
shortly thereafter in Ho Chi Minh City. During the July 10 protest in Hanoi,
police detained at least 20 individuals. One week later authorities temporarily
suspended Hanoi Police Captain Pham Hai Minh from duty when he was photographed
trampling the face of one of the protesters. On August 18, the Hanoi People’s
Committee issued a decree “banning all spontaneous gatherings, demonstrations,
and parades.” On August 22, police arrested 50 individuals for protesting in
violation of that decree; authorities released all 50 five days later, but
protest leaders and fellow demonstrators thereafter remained under investigation
and reported being monitored by police. On September 5, a group of 10 persons
filed a lawsuit against state-controlled media for claiming that hostile forces
incited the protesters.
On
November 8, plainclothes security officials beat and detained approximately 30
Falun Gong practitioners who demonstrated outside the Chinese embassy in Hanoi
in support of Vu Duc Trung and Le Van Thanh, whom authorities had arrested in
2010 and charged with broadcasting illegally into China (see also section 1.e.,
Political Prisoners and Detainees).
Freedom of Association
The
government severely restricted freedom of association and neither permitted nor
tolerated opposition political parties. The government prohibited the
establishment of private, independent organizations, insisting that persons
work within established, party-controlled mass organizations, usually under the
aegis of the VFF. However, some entities, including unregistered religious
groups, were able to operate outside of this framework with little or no
government interference.
Authorities
occasionally physically prevented political activists and family members of
political prisoners from meeting with foreign diplomats. Tactics included
setting up barriers or guards outside diplomats’ residences or calling
individuals into local police stations for random and repetitive questioning.
c. Freedom of Religion
See
the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt.
d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection
of Refugees, and Stateless Persons
The
constitution provides for freedom of movement within the country, foreign
travel, emigration, and repatriation, but the government imposed some limits on
freedom of movement for certain individuals. The government generally
cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in providing
protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, returning
refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern.
Local
government authorities observed but did not hinder the UNHCR and foreign
diplomatic fact-finding and monitoring visits to the Central Highlands. The
UNHCR reported that it was able to meet with returnees in private. Foreign
diplomats experienced some resistance from lower-level officials in permitting
private interviews of returnees. As in previous years, local police officials
sometimes were present during foreign diplomat interviews with returnees but
left when asked. Provincial governments generally continued to honor their
obligations to reintegrate peacefully ethnic minority returnees from Cambodia.
In
February, 55 Montagnards who fled the Central Highlands for Cambodia were
resettled in third countries. The UNHCR, which conducted several monitoring
trips during the year, reported that there was “no perceptible evidence of
mistreatment” of any of the ethnic minority individuals it monitored in the
Central Highlands.
In-country
Movement: Several political dissidents, amnestied with probation or under house
arrest, were subject to official restrictions on their movements.
A
government restriction regarding travel to certain areas remained in effect. It
requires citizens and resident foreigners to obtain a permit to visit border
areas; defense facilities; industrial zones involved in national defense; areas
of “national strategic storage;” and “works of extreme importance for
political, economic, cultural, and social purposes.”
Local
police require citizens to register when staying overnight in any location
outside of their own homes; the government appeared to enforce these
requirements more strictly in some Central and Northern Highlands districts.
Foreign passport holders must also register to stay in private homes, although
there were no known cases of local authorities refusing to allow foreign
visitors to stay with friends and family.
The
law on residence was not broadly implemented, and migration from rural areas to
cities continued unabated. However, moving without permission hampered persons
seeking legal residence permits, public education, and health-care benefits.
Foreign
Travel: Officials
occasionally delayed citizens’ access to passports in order to extort bribes,
and prospective emigrants occasionally encountered difficulties obtaining a
passport.
For
example, in July authorities stopped Father Dinh Huu Thoai, chief of office of
the Redemptorist Church of Vietnam, at the Moc Bai border gate (Tay Ninh
Province) and prevented him from leaving the country. In September security
forces prevented human rights lawyer Huynh Van Dong from leaving the country.
Although
their probation ended years earlier, the government continued to prohibit
dissidents Nguyen Khac Toan, Pham Hong Son, Le Thi Kim Thu, and others from
receiving a passport and traveling overseas during the year. Authorities
continued to allow attorney Le Quoc Quan, attorney Le Tran Luat, and journalist
Nguyen Vu Binh to travel within the country but prohibited them from traveling
overseas.
Emigration
and Repatriation:
The government generally permitted citizens who had emigrated to return to
visit, although it refused to allow certain activists or other individuals
living abroad to return. Known Vietnamese political activists overseas were
denied entry visas or were detained and deported after entering the country.
For example, on August 1, authorities denied Radio Free Asia reporter Tuong Anh
entry after he arrived at Tan Son Nhat airport, Ho Chi Minh City, from abroad.
The
government continued to honor a tripartite memorandum of understanding signed
with Cambodia and the UNHCR to facilitate the return from Cambodia of all
ethnic Vietnamese who did not qualify for third-country resettlement.
Citizenship: By law the
government considers anyone born to at least one Vietnamese-citizen parent to
be a citizen. There are also provisions for persons who do not have a
Vietnamese-citizen parent to acquire citizenship under certain conditions.
Emigrants who acquire another country’s citizenship generally are considered
still to be Vietnamese citizens unless they formally renounce their Vietnamese
citizenship. However, in practice the government treated overseas Vietnamese as
citizens of their adopted country. Legislation seeks to clarify this apparent
discrepancy by allowing for dual citizenship. The government generally
encouraged visits and investment by such persons but sometimes monitored them
carefully. The government continued to liberalize travel restrictions for
overseas Vietnamese, including permitting visa-free travel and permitting
individuals to petition to receive Vietnamese passports.
Protection of Refugees
The
law does not provide for the granting of refugee status, and the government has
not established a system for providing protection to refugees.
Access
to Asylum:
The law does not provide for the granting of asylum.
Safe
Country of Origin/Transit: Government regulations and policy do not explicitly
provide protection against the expulsion or return of persons where their lives
or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. No such cases
were reported during the year.
Stateless Persons
The
country’s largest stateless group consisted of approximately 9,500 Cambodian
residents who sought refuge in Vietnam in the 1970s and were denied the right
to return by the government of Cambodia, which asserted no proof existed that
these individuals had ever possessed Cambodian citizenship. Almost all were ethnic
Chinese or Vietnamese whom authorities initially settled in four refugee camps
in and around Ho Chi Minh City. When humanitarian assistance in these camps
ceased in 1994, an estimated 7,000 refugees left the camps in search of work
and opportunities in Ho Chi Minh City and the surrounding area. An additional
2,100 remained in four villages in which the camps once operated. Many had
children and grandchildren born in Vietnam, but neither the original refugees
nor their children enjoy the same rights as Vietnamese citizens, including the
right to property ownership, comparable access to education, and public medical
care. In July 2010 the first group of 287 individuals received Vietnamese
citizenship as part of a joint UNHCR-government effort to survey and naturalize
these stateless individuals. The naturalization applications for the
approximately 1,800 remaining were submitted to the president’s office for
final approval, but no action was reported at year’s end.
The
Women’s Union continued to work with the government of South Korea to address
international marriage brokering and premarriage counseling, including
education on immigration and citizenship regulations. Some domestic and
international NGOs provided assistance.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights:
The Right of Citizens to Change Their GovernmentShare
The
constitution does not provide for the right of citizens to change their
government peacefully, and citizens could not freely choose the officials that
govern them.
Elections and Political Participation
Recent
Elections:
The most recent elections, in May to select members of the National Assembly,
were neither free nor fair, since the VFF chose and vetted all candidates.
Despite the CPV’s announcement that a greater number of “independent”
candidates (those not linked to a certain organization or group) would run in
the elections, the ratio of independents to other candidates was lower than
that of the 2007 election. The CPV approved 15 “self-nominated” candidates who
did not have official government backing but were allowed to run for office.
There were credible reports that party officials pressured many self-nominated
candidates to withdraw or found such candidates “ineligible” to run.
According
to the government, more than 99 percent of the 62 million eligible voters cast
ballots in the May election, a figure that international observers considered
improbably high. (Voters are permitted to cast ballots by proxy, and local
authorities are charged with assuring that all eligible voters cast ballots by
organizing group voting and all voters within their jurisdiction are recorded
as having voted.) CPV candidates won 458 of the 500 seats. Only four of the 15
self-nominated candidates won.
The
National Assembly, although subject to the control of the CPV (all of its
senior leaders and more than 90 percent of its members are party members),
continued to take incremental steps to assert itself as a legislative body. A
majority of National Assembly committees increased the number of members on the
committees in an attempt to exert more influence over budgetary matters and to
review and provide recommendations on policy matters. For example, the number
of members on the External Relations Committee increased from 30 to 36, the
Committee on Social Issues increased its membership from 40 to 50 members, and
the committees on legal affairs and defense increased the number of vice
chairs. In August the National Assembly appointed a Constitutional Amendment
Drafting Committee and adopted a statement by its Standing Committee giving
guidance on the scope and timetable of the drafting process.
Political
Parties:
The constitution vests all authority and political power in one party, the CPV,
and recognizes the leadership of the CPV. The CPV Politburo functions as the
supreme decision-making body in the country, although technically it reports to
the CPV Central Committee. Political opposition movements and other political
parties are illegal.
The
government continued to restrict public debate and criticism severely. No
public challenge to the legitimacy of the one-party state was permitted,
although there were instances of unsanctioned letters critical of government
policy from private citizens. For example, former government officials and
leading academicians criticized the government’s decision to allow substantial
foreign investment in bauxite mining and its handling of sovereignty claims in
the South China Sea (East Sea). The government continued to crack down on the
small, opposition political groups established in 2006, and group members faced
arrests and arbitrary detentions.
Members
of Bloc 8406 and other political activist groups that call for the creation of
a multiparty state continued to face harassment and imprisonment.
Participation
of Women and Minorities: The law provides the opportunity for equal
participation in politics by women and minority groups. There were 122 women in
the National Assembly, or approximately 24 percent--a slightly lower percentage
than in the previous assembly.
Ethnic
minorities held 78 seats, or approximately 16 percent, in the National
Assembly--a decline from the previous assembly.
Section 4. Official Corruption and
Government TransparencyShare
The
law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government
did not always implement the law effectively, and officials sometimes engaged
in corrupt practices with impunity. Corruption continued to be a major problem.
The government persisted in efforts to fight corruption, including publicizing
budgets of different government levels, continuing to streamline inspection
measures, and occasionally widely publicizing cases of officials accused of
corruption.
The
anticorruption law allows citizens to complain openly about inefficient
government, administrative procedures, corruption, and economic policy.
However, the government continued to consider public political criticism a
crime unless the criticism was controlled by authorities. Attempts to organize
those with complaints to facilitate action are considered proscribed political
activities and subject to arrest. Senior government and party leaders traveled
to many provinces, reportedly to try to resolve citizen complaints. Corruption
related to land use was widely publicized in the press, apparently in an officially
orchestrated effort to bring pressure on local officials to reduce abuses.
Corruption
among police remained a significant problem at all levels, and members of the
police sometimes acted with impunity. Internal police oversight structures
existed but were subject to political influence.
Foreign
aid donors conducted an annual anticorruption dialogue as part of consultative
group meetings with the government. Previous dialogues focused on corruption in
the education, health, and construction sectors.
According
to an annual report by the government’s Anticorruption Steering Committee
released in June, state agencies initiated preliminary investigations into 100
cases of corruption-related crimes, an increase of approximately 5 percent
compared with the same period during the previous year. There were 185
suspects, an increase of 3 percent, and authorities brought 97 cases to the
court of first instance. According to the annual report of the Office of the
Inspectorate General, it investigated 220 cases of corruption/fraud involving
449 individuals during the year, a majority of which continued under
investigation at year’s end.
In
June authorities charged Pham Thanh Hai, an accountant in the government’s
department of cinematography, with embezzling VND 42 million (approximately
$2,100) from the department’s annual budget.
In
September the Supreme People’s Court in Hanoi concluded its investigation into
the August 2010 allegations of misappropriation in the shipbuilding
conglomerate Vinashin and found that nearly VND 900 billion (approximately $43
million) had been misappropriated. The court charged Chief Executive Officer
Pham Thanh Binh and eight others--board members Tran Quang Vu and Tran Van
Liem, former subsidiary general directors Nguyen Van Tuyen and Nguyen Tuan
Duong plus To Nghiem, Trinh Thi Hau, Hoang Gia Hiep, and Do Dinh Con--with
“deliberately acting against state regulations and economic mismanagement,
causing serious consequences.” These offenses are punishable by up to 12 years
in prison. At year’s end the accused awaited trial as well as additional
investigation on other, related charges.
In
June a court convicted Tran Van Khanh, the former director general of Vietnam
General Corporation of Agriculture Materials, of “abusing powers while performing
official duties” and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. Specifically,
in 2003-04 Khanh illegally sold company fertilizer to individuals outside of
working hours and rented company vehicles to private individuals, from which he
pocketed more than VND 3 billion (approximately $140,000).
In
May the former governor of the State Bank of Vietnam, Le Duc Thuy, retired from
his position after coming under investigation for allegedly taking bribes from
the Reserve Bank of Australia currency supplier (Securency). It was claimed
that, for the exchange of an undisclosed amount of money, Thuy helped Securency
win banknote supply contracts during the period 2002-09 and that Securency
deposited funds for Thuy into an overseas account belonging to a member of the
government’s public security bureau, Colonel Luong Ngoc Anh. An investigation
continued at year’s end.
By
government decree various government officials must annually report by November
30 the real estate, precious metals, and “valuable papers” they own; money they
hold in overseas and domestic bank accounts; and their taxable income. The
government must publicize these asset declarations only if a government
employee is found “unusually wealthy” and investigation or legal proceedings
are needed. In addition to senior government and party officials, the decree
applies to prosecutors, judges, and those at and above the rank of deputy
provincial party chief, deputy provincial party chairperson, deputy faculty
head at public hospitals, and deputy battalion chief. Due to a lack of
transparency, it was not known how widely the decree was enforced.
The
Ministry of Public Security is responsible for investigating corruption charges
brought forward by anticorruption offices in the Ministry of Home Affairs and
the Office of the Inspectorate General. Additionally, the Central Steering
Committee on Anticorruption reports directly to the Office of the Prime
Minister and has the responsibility to direct, coordinate, inspect, and
formulate countrywide anticorruption activities. This committee periodically
provides reports on anticorruption activities to the CPV Central Committee,
National Assembly, and Office of the State President. It is also responsible
for suspending and/or dismissing senior officials appointed by the prime
minister who are convicted of corrupt practices.
The
law does not provide for public access to government information, and the
government usually did not grant such access to citizens or noncitizens,
including foreign media. In accordance with the law, the Official Gazette
published most government legal documents in its daily edition but not party
documents such as Politburo decrees. The government maintained a Web site in
both Vietnamese and English, as did the National Assembly. In addition decisions
made by the Supreme People’s Court Council of Judges were accessible a majority
of the time through the court’s Web site. During his March visit, the UN
independent expert on foreign debt and human rights called on the government to
make information on debt and development assistance broadly available to
enhance transparency and accountability in the management and use of public
resources.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude
Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human RightsShare
The
government does not permit private, local human rights organizations to form or
operate, nor does it tolerate attempts by organizations or individuals to
comment publicly on its human rights practices. The government used a wide
variety of methods to suppress domestic criticism of its human rights policies,
including surveillance, limits on freedom of the press and assembly,
interference with personal communications, and detention.
UN
and Other International Bodies: The government generally prohibited
private citizens from contacting international human rights organizations,
although several activists did so. The government usually did not permit visits
by international NGO human rights monitors, although it allowed representatives
from the UNHCR, press, foreign governments, and international development and
relief NGOs to visit the Central Highlands. The government criticized almost
all public statements on human rights and religious matters by international
NGOs and foreign governments.
Government
Human Rights Bodies:
The government discussed human rights matters bilaterally with several foreign
governments and continued to hold official talks concerning human rights,
typically through annual human rights dialogues.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal
Abuses, and Trafficking in PersonsShare
The
law prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, disability, language, or
social status, but enforcement of these prohibitions was uneven.
Rape
and Domestic Violence:
The law prohibits using or threatening violence against women or taking
advantage of a person who cannot act in self-defense. It also criminalizes
rape, including spousal rape. Rapists are subject to two to seven years’
imprisonment. In severe cases of rape, including organized rape, a repeat
offense, or extreme harm to the victim, sentences may range from seven to 15
years in prison. Authorities reportedly prosecuted rape cases to the full
extent of the law, but the government did not make arrest, prosecution, conviction,
and punishment statistics available.
Domestic
violence against women was common. A 2010 UN report found that 58 percent of
married women had been victims of physical, sexual, or emotional domestic
violence. Domestic violence cases were treated as civil ones, unless the victim
suffered injuries involving more than 11 percent of her body.
The
law specifies acts constituting domestic violence, assigns specific portfolio
responsibilities to different government agencies and ministries, and stipulates
punishments for perpetrators ranging from warnings, through probation for up to
three years, to imprisonment for three months to three years. However, NGO and
survivor advocates considered many of the provisions to be weak, and the
government did not make arrest, prosecution, conviction, and punishment
statistics available. Officials acknowledged domestic violence as a significant
social concern, and the media discussed it more openly during the year. While
the police and legal system generally remained unequipped to deal with cases of
domestic violence, the government, with the help of international and domestic
NGOs, continued to train police, lawyers, and legal system officials in the
law.
Several
domestic and international NGOs worked to address domestic violence. Hotlines
for victims operated by domestic NGOs existed in major cities. The Center for
Women and Development, supported by the Women’s Union, also operated a
nationwide hotline, although it was not widely advertised in rural areas. It
conducted 2,161 consultations regarding 1,858 cases during the year. While
rural areas often lacked the financial resources to provide crisis centers and
hotlines, a law establishes “reliable residences” to allow women to turn to
another family while local authorities and community leaders attempt to
confront the abuser and resolve complaints. Many women remained in abusive
marriages rather than confront social and family stigma as well as economic
uncertainty.
The
government, with the help of international NGOs, supported workshops and
seminars aimed at educating women and men about domestic violence and women’s
rights in general and highlighted the problem through public awareness
campaigns. Local NGOs affiliated with the Women’s Union remained engaged in
women’s issues, particularly violence against women and trafficking of women
and children.
Sexual
Harassment:
According to the government, sexual harassment of adults is not illegal, and
there is no legal requirement to prevent it. There also is no law to protect employees
from sexual harassment in the workplace. However, the law prohibits employers
from discriminating against female workers or offending their dignity and
honor, although there were no known prosecutions during the year. Publications
and training on ethical regulations for government and other public servants do
not mention the problem, although it existed.
Victims
of sexual harassment may contact social associations such as the Women’s Union
to request their involvement. If the victim has access to a labor union
representative, complaints can also be lodged with union officers. In serious
cases victims may sue offenders under a provision that deals with “humiliating
other persons” and specifies punishments that include a warning, noncustodial
reform for up to two years, or a prison term ranging from three months to two
years. Nevertheless, sexual harassment lawsuits continued to be unheard of, and
most victims were unwilling to denounce offenders publicly.
Reproductive
Rights:
The law affirms an individual’s right to choose contraceptive methods; access
gynecological diagnosis, treatment, and health check-ups during pregnancy; and
obtain medical services when giving birth at health facilities, and the
government generally enforced the law. Nonetheless, unmarried women of
reproductive ages had limited or no access to subsidized contraceptives due to
government policy and lack of access in rural areas. Women and men were equally
diagnosed and treated for sexually transmitted infections.
Although
the Population and Reproductive Health Strategy for 2011-20--applicable to all
citizens--no longer specifically referred to the number of children per couple,
it set a target of maintaining the average number of children per
reproductive-age couple at 1.8. The government, primarily through media
campaigns, strongly encouraged individuals to practice family planning. There
was also anecdotal information that authorities would not promote government
officials if they had more than two children.
Discrimination: The law provides
for gender equality in all aspects of life, but women continued to face
societal discrimination. Despite the large body of law and regulation devoted
to the protection of women’s rights in marriage and the workplace, as well as
provisions that call for preferential treatment, women did not always receive
equal treatment. They experienced economic discrimination since they cannot
work in all the same industries as men and are not allowed to work the same
hours as men (due to pregnancy or nursing). Moreover, no laws prohibit
employers from asking about family status during job interviews.
Although
the law provides for equal inheritance rights for men and women, in practice
women faced cultural discrimination: A son was more likely to inherit property
than a daughter, unless specified by a legal document. Laws prohibit
gender-based preferential hiring for jobs, and while NGOs assumed that such
discrimination occurred, allegations were hard to prove.
The
CPV-affiliated Women’s Union and the government’s National Committee for the
Advancement of Women continued to promote women’s rights, including political,
economic, and legal equality, and protection from spousal abuse. The Women’s
Union also operated microcredit consumer-finance programs and other programs to
promote the advancement of women. In April the National Strategy Plan for
Gender Equality replaced the National Plan of Action for the Advancement of
Women. Key areas of the strategy were similar to plan goals but also moved
beyond advancement to recognize broader inequities in access to social services
and focus on developing indicators; placing more women in senior ministry
positions and the legislature; and increasing literacy rates, access to
education, and health care.
According
to a 2010 UN Population Fund report, the national average male-female sex ratio
at birth was 111 to 100. The imbalanced ratio of newborn boys to girls
continued to increase, particularly in some wealthier areas of Hanoi and Ho Chi
Minh City. The government acknowledged the issue and was taking steps to
address it.
Children
Birth
Registration:
By law the government considers anyone born to at least one Vietnamese citizen
parent to be a citizen, although persons born to non-Vietnamese parents may
also acquire citizenship under certain circumstances. Not all births were
registered immediately, sometimes due to a lack of knowledge among the
populace. A birth certificate is required for public services, such as
education and health care, and the choice by some parents, especially ethnic
minorities, not to register their children affected the ability to enroll them
in school and receive government-sponsored health care.
Education: Education is
compulsory, free, and universal through the age of 14. Nevertheless,
authorities did not always enforce the requirement, especially in rural areas,
where government and family budgets for education were strained and children’s
contributions as agricultural laborers were valued.
Child
Abuse:
The UN and the General Statistics Office found that 25 percent of children were
victims of child abuse as reported by their mothers during a study on domestic
violence. The government did not make information available on the extent of
the problem or its efforts to combat it.
Sexual
Exploitation of Children: Sexual harassment of children under age 16 is illegal.
The law criminalizes all acts of sale, fraudulent exchange, or control of
children as well as all acts related to child prostitution and forced child
labor. Sentences range from three years’ to life imprisonment, and fines range
from VND five million to VND 50 million (approximately $240 to $2,400). The law
also specifies prison sentences for acts related to child prostitution,
including harboring prostitution (12 to 20 years), brokering prostitution
(seven to 15 years), and buying sex with minors (three to 15 years). Similarly,
the law prohibits all acts of cruel treatment, humiliation, abduction, sale,
and coercion of children into any activities harmful to their healthy
development and provides for the protection and care of disadvantaged children.
The
minimum age of consensual sex is 18. Statutory rape is illegal and may result
in life imprisonment or capital punishment. Penalties for sex with minors
between the ages of 16 and 18, depending upon the circumstances, vary from five
to 10 years in prison. The production, distribution, dissemination, or selling
of child pornography is illegal and carries a sentence of three to 10 years’
imprisonment.
According
to preliminary findings released in July of a 2010 survey conducted by UNICEF
and the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA), child
prostitution, child trafficking for sexual purposes, child sex tourism, and
child pornography occurred in Vietnam. The report showed that children as young
as age 12 worked as prostitutes, with the most commonly observed age being
14-15. Some minors entered into prostitution for economic reasons.
Displaced
Children:
Independent NGOs estimated that 23,000-25,000 children lived on the streets and
were sometimes abused or harassed by police.
Institutionalized
Children:
There were no shelters designed specifically for child victims of trafficking
or abuse. Instead, authorities placed them in facilities with survivors of
domestic violence or adult trafficking. The government allocated VND 1.25
trillion (approximately $59.5 million) for the draft National Program of Action
for Children for 2011-20. The new program’s focus is assistance for
disadvantaged children with priority for the 12 poorest provinces. The government
also promulgated the National Program on Child Protection 2011-15, which was
approved in February.
International
Child Abductions: The
country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction.
Anti-Semitism
There
were small expatriate Jewish communities in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, and
there were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.
Trafficking in Persons
See
the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip.
Persons with Disabilities
The
constitution provides for the protection of persons with physical disabilities.
The law prohibits discrimination against or maltreatment of persons with
disabilities; encourages their employment; and requires equality for them in
accommodation, access to education, employment, health care, rehabilitation,
transportation, and vocational training.
The
provision of services to persons with disabilities, although limited, improved
during the year. The Ministry of Transportation implemented accessibility codes
for public transportation facilities, trained transportation agency officials
and students on the use of the codes, and developed training materials for bus
drivers to assist individuals on and off buses. The government also put in
place four accessible bus routes in Ho Chi Minh City and Danang with accessible
buses and distributed free bus tickets (or reduced the fares for) 26,000
individuals in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
Construction
and major renovations of new government and large public buildings are required
to include access for persons with disabilities, but enforcement was sporadic.
New buildings and facilities in larger urban cities were built with ramps and
accessible entries. The Ministry of Construction maintained enforcement units
in the cities of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, Danang, Quang Nam, and Ninh Binh to
enforce barrier-free codes and provided training on construction codes for
inspectors and architectural companies in more than 20 provinces during the
year.
Access
to education for children with disabilities, including blindness, deafness, and
mobility restrictions, was extremely limited. The law provides for preferential
treatment for firms that recruit persons with disabilities and for fines on
firms that do not meet minimum quotas that reserve 2 to 3 percent of their
workforce for workers with disabilities, but the government enforced these
provisions unevenly. Firms that have 51 percent of their employees with
disabilities may qualify for special government-subsidized loans.
The
government respected the political and civil rights of persons with
disabilities. For example, by law ballot boxes may be and were brought to the
homes of individuals unable to go to a polling station.
The
government supported the establishment of organizations aiding persons with
disabilities. Such persons were consulted in the development or review of
national programs, such as the national poverty reduction program, vocational
laws, and various educational policies. The National Coordination Committee on
Disabilities and its ministry members worked with domestic and foreign
organizations to provide protection, support, physical access, education, and
employment. The government operated a small network of rehabilitation centers
to provide long-term, inpatient physical therapy. Several provinces, government
agencies, and universities had specific programs for persons with disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Although
the government officially prohibits discrimination against ethnic minorities,
longstanding societal discrimination against ethnic minorities persisted.
Despite the country’s significant economic growth, some ethnic minority
communities benefited little from improved economic conditions. In certain
areas, including the Northwest and Central Highlands and portions of the Mekong
Delta, ethnic minority groups made up the majority of the population.
Some
members of ethnic minority groups continued to leave for Cambodia and Thailand,
reportedly to seek greater economic opportunity or shortcuts to migration to
other countries. The government monitored certain highland minorities closely,
particularly several ethnic groups in the Central and Northwest Highlands,
where it continued to be concerned that the religion they practice encouraged
ethnic minority separatism.
The
government imposed increased security measures in the Central and Northwest
Highlands in response to concerns over possible ethnic minority separatist
activity. There were reports that ethnic minority individuals who telephoned
ethnic minority community members abroad were a special target of police
attention. Authorities arrested and convicted several individuals connected to
overseas separatist organizations and sentenced them to lengthy prison terms in
2011. During the period around sensitive occasions and holidays, an increased
security presence was reported throughout the region. There were a few reports
that Vietnamese police operating on both sides of the border returned members of
ethnic minorities seeking to enter Cambodia and sometimes beat and detained
them.
In
late April and early May, 5,000 ethnic Hmong in Dien Bien Province gathered in
Muong Nhe District as part of a millennium movement. Security personnel
dispersed the crowd and arrested 150 individuals. According to the government,
seven detainees (among them were Thao A Lao, Mu A Thang, Trang A Do, and Giang
A Xi from Dien Bien Province) remained in police custody at year’s end, charged
with preventing government officials from performing official duties, and an
investigation continued.
The
government continued to address the causes of ethnic minority discontent
through special programs to improve education and health facilities and expand
road access and electrification of rural communities and villages. The
government continued to allocate land to ethnic minorities in the Central
Highlands through a special program, but there were valid complaints that
implementation was uneven.
The
government maintained a program to conduct classes in some local ethnic
minority languages in elementary and secondary schools. The government also
worked with local officials to develop local language curricula, but it
appeared to implement this program more comprehensively in the Central Highlands
and the Mekong Delta, and only in limited areas of the Northwest Highlands. The
law provides for universal education for children regardless of religion or
ethnicity, and ethnic minorities are not required to pay regular school fees.
The government operated special schools for ethnic minority children, and there
were 223 boarding schools for them in the Northwest and Central Highlands and
the Mekong Delta, including at middle- and high-school levels plus special
admission and preparatory programs as well as scholarships and preferential
admissions at the university level. There were also a few government-subsidized
technical and vocational schools for ethnic minorities. Nonetheless, there were
some credible cases of discrimination against ethnic minorities.
The
government broadcast radio and television programs in ethnic minority languages
in some areas. The government also instructed ethnic-majority (Kinh) officials
to learn the language of the locality in which they worked. Provincial
governments continued initiatives designed to increase employment, reduce the
income gap between ethnic minorities and ethnic Kinh, and make officials
sensitive and receptive to ethnic minority culture and traditions. Nonetheless,
local security officials detained Tang Thuy, an ethnic Khmer Krom minority
group member from Soc Trang Province, for two days in March for questioning
about his participation in a meeting that called for the government to respect
the rights of all ethnic minorities.
The
government granted preferential treatment to domestic and foreign companies
that invested in highland areas populated predominantly by ethnic minorities.
The government also maintained infrastructure development programs that
targeted poor, largely ethnic-minority areas and established agricultural
extension programs for remote rural areas.
The
National Assembly’s Ethnic Minority Council, along with provincial Ethnic
Minority Steering Committees, supported infrastructure development and
addressed some issues related to poverty reduction and an increase in literacy
rates during the year.
Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Consensual
same-sex sexual activity is not criminalized, although by decree, individuals
may not change their gender. There was no reported official discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender identity, but societal discrimination and
stigma were pervasive. A lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
community existed but was largely underground.
A
2009 survey of more than 3,200 LGBT individuals by the Institute for Studies of
Society, Economy, and the Environment reported that 4.5 percent claimed they
were victims of assault or physical abuse by homophobic individuals and 6.5
percent claimed they lost jobs because of their sexual orientation. The
institute also reported that government officials, the Women’s Union, and the
Lawyers Association participated in sensitivity training during the year. Most
LGBT persons chose not to tell family of their sexual orientation for fear of
being disowned, and a 2011 online survey, conducted by the Information Sharing
and Connecting Group with more than one thousand LGBT respondents, noted that
more than 20 percent were forced into counseling by their families.
Other Societal Violence or Discrimination
There
was no evidence of official discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS, but
societal discrimination against such persons existed. Individuals who tested
positive for HIV reported latent social stigma and discrimination, although not
in receiving medical treatment for their condition. The law states that
employers cannot fire individuals for having HIV/AIDS and doctors cannot refuse
to treat persons with HIV/AIDS. However, there were credible reports that
persons with HIV/AIDS lost jobs or suffered from discrimination in the
workplace or in finding housing, although the number of such reports decreased.
The government reported approximately 5,100 school-age children with HIV/AIDS.
In several cases HIV/AIDS-positive children or orphans were barred from schools
due to pressure from other parents. With the assistance of foreign donors, the
national government and provincial authorities took steps to treat, assist, and
accommodate persons with HIV/AIDS and thereby decrease societal stigma and
discrimination, but these measures were not consistently applied. Faith-based
charities were sometimes permitted to provide HIV prevention and home-based
care services to persons with or affected by HIV/AIDS.
Section 7. Worker RightsShare
a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining
The
law does not allow workers to organize and join independent unions of their
choice. While workers may choose whether to join a union and at which level
(local, provincial, or national) they wish to participate, every union must be
affiliated with the country’s only trade union confederation, the Vietnam
General Confederation of Labor (VGCL). The VGCL, a union umbrella organization
controlled by the CPV, approves and manages a range of subsidiary labor unions
organized according to location and industry. By law the provincial or
metropolitan branch of the VGCL is responsible for organizing a union within
six months of the establishment of any new enterprise, and management is
required to cooperate with the union.
The
law outlines mandatory union dues for union members and domestic and foreign
employers. While these dues were intended to support workers and union
activities, neither the VGCL nor the government, which is responsible for dues
collection, provided transparent information regarding their use. Although the
law does not allow for independent unions, it permits the negotiation of
disputes to be led and organized by “relevant entities,” which may be composed
of worker representatives when the enterprise in question does not have a
union, i.e., during the first six months after an enterprise is established.
The law allows for “union activities” during this period, especially during
emergencies such as a strike.
The
law permits strikes under certain prescribed circumstances and stipulates an
extensive and cumbersome process of mediation and arbitration that must be
followed before a lawful strike may occur.
The
law prohibits strikes in businesses that serve the public or that the
government considers essential to the national economy and defense. The law
also grants the prime minister the right to suspend a strike considered
detrimental to the national economy or public safety. The law defines
“essential services” more broadly than in International Labor Organization
(ILO) criteria. A decree defines these enterprises as ones involved in
electricity production; post and telecommunications; maritime and air
transportation, navigation, and management; public works; and oil and gas. The
essential services list was reduced by nearly 60 percent in April (effective
June 1), from 142 firms to 58.
Strikes
that do not arise from a collective labor dispute or do not adhere to the
process outlined by law are illegal. Before workers may hold a strike, they
must take their claims through a process involving a conciliation council (or a
district-level labor conciliator where no union is present). If the two parties
cannot reach a resolution, the claims must be submitted to a provincial arbitration
council. Unions (or workers’ representatives where no union is present) have
the right either to appeal decisions of provincial arbitration councils to
provincial people’s courts or to go on strike. Individual workers may take
cases directly to the people’s court system, but in most cases they may do so
only after conciliation has been attempted and failed. The law also stipulates
that workers on strike will not be paid wages while they are not at work.
The
law prohibits retribution against strikers, and there were some anecdotal
reports of employer retaliation against strike participants by limiting future
employment prospects. For example, MOLISA’s Center for Industrial Relations
reported the case of a company photographing workers on strike and sending the
photographs to other companies within their business association. Local news
reported that employees at a Panasonic factory accused the company of creating
a list of striking workers. By law individuals participating in strikes
declared illegal by a people’s court and found to have caused damage to their
employer are liable for damages.
The
law provides VGCL-affiliated unions the right to bargain collectively on behalf
of workers. Collective labor disputes over rights must be routed through a conciliation
council and, if the council cannot resolve the matter, to the chairperson of
the district-level people’s committee.
In
practice VGCL leaders influenced key decisions by drafting, amending, or
commenting on labor legislation; developing social safety nets; and setting
health, safety, and minimum wage standards. Labor activists and representatives
of independent (non-VGCL) workers’ organizations faced antiunion discrimination
(see section 1.e., Political Prisoners and Detainees).
There
was little evidence that leaders or organizations active during the first six
months’ window after an enterprise was established continued to be active or
recognized thereafter.
The
VGCL reported 981 strikes during the year. The main reason for the high number
of strikes--more than double the number in 2010--was reportedly the negative
impact of high inflation on workers’ living conditions. The majority of these
strikes occurred in Ho Chi Minh City and surrounding provinces in
foreign-invested enterprises (mainly South Korean and Taiwanese companies).
None of the strikes followed the authorized conciliation and arbitration
process and thus were considered illegal, “wildcat” strikes. The government
tolerated these strikes and not only took no action against the strikers but on
occasion also actively mediated agreements in the workers’ favor. In some cases
the government disciplined employers, especially with foreign-owned companies,
for the illegal practices that led to strikes.
There
were credible reports that employers tended to use short-term or probationary
contracts to avoid certain legally mandated worker benefits, such as
unemployment insurance, or to inhibit workers from joining unions.
b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The
law prohibits forced and compulsory labor, except as defined by administrative
or criminal penalties. Nonetheless, according to government and NGO reports,
forced labor of adults and children occurred (see section7.c.).
There
were reports from credible NGOs that the government, especially the Ministry of
Public Security, increased efforts to prevent forced labor, and the government
reported criminal prosecutions for forced labor during the reporting period. In
response to reports of forced labor on domestic coffee plantations, Lam Dong
Province authorities issued a directive in November calling for increased
inspections and stricter punishments against illegal labor brokers who offered
jobs on coffee plantations.
Prisoners
convicted by courts routinely were required to work for little or no pay.
Authorities routinely required individuals, detained under administrative
decree in reeducation centers and detention centers for sex workers and drug
users, to work for little or no pay under administrative and legislative
regulations. They produced food and other goods used directly in prisons or
sold on local markets, reportedly to purchase items for their personal use.
There were credible reports that private companies hired individuals in drug
detention centers.
There
was also information that suggested workers in centers for social and
educational rehabilitation were engaged in agriculture (growing rice and
vegetables; raising poultry, fish, and other livestock; and shelling cashews or
other nuts), manufacturing (producing bicycle tires, mosquito nets, false
eye-lashes, pottery, bamboo or rattan products, and shoes and apparel), and
construction work.
In
September an international human rights organization reported that authorities
forced individuals in the detention centers for drug users to engage in unpaid
or underpaid work as part of their treatment. In response, MOLISA officials
confirmed that “therapeutic labor” was one part of the treatment for
individuals in these centers but asserted that it was not required of all
individuals and was remunerated. The officials also reported providing orders
to provincial officials to halt construction of any new drug detention centers
and cease all actions that violated labor regulations.
Also
see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip.
c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment
The
law prohibits most child labor but allows exceptions for certain types of work.
The law sets the minimum age for employment at 18 years, but enterprises may
hire children between ages 15 and 18 if the firm obtains permission from
parents and MOLISA. Enterprises hiring young labor (ages 15-18) have to provide
them with special considerations concerning working hours, annual leave, and
working environment. Children ages 15-18 may work a maximum of seven hours per
day and 42 hours per week and must receive special health care.
The
law permits children to register at trade training centers, a form of
vocational training, from age 13. By law an employer must ensure that workers
under age 18 do not undertake hazardous work or work that would harm their
physical or mental development. Prohibited occupations are specified in law and
include those requiring compressed working posture, direct contact with harmful
chemicals, contact with radioactive substances, work with various types of
furnaces or hot metal, driving motor vehicles, operating stone grinding
machines, and operating machines for starching cloth and cotton yarns, among
others.
MOLISA
is responsible for enforcing child labor laws and policies. Government
officials may fine and, in cases of criminal violations, prosecute employers
who violate child labor laws. Generally the government committed insufficient
resources to enforce effectively laws providing for children’s safety,
especially for children working in mines and as domestic servants. However,
there were several reports that the government detected some cases of child
exploitation, removed children from exploitative situations, and
prosecuted/fined employers during the year. In April Lam Dong Province
authorities closed and burned illegal tin mining sites where children were
employed. In September authorities rescued two dozen children from “slave
labor” in a private garment factory; at year’s end the factory owners awaited
trial.
A
2011 investigation by the Ho Chi Minh City Department of Labor, Invalids, and
Social Affairs showed that child labor appeared in seven of 24 districts and
approximately 90 percent of establishments using child labor did not have
business licenses. MOLISA maintained that more than 25,000 children worked in
hazardous conditions countrywide, a statistic that international observers
continued to believe was actually higher.
The
government approved in February its first five-year National Program on Child
Protection and committed approximately VND 1.75 trillion ($83.3 million) toward
implementation from both central and local government budgets. The government
also continued programs to eliminate persistent child labor, with a particular
focus on needy families and orphans. A joint project with the ILO to eliminate
the worst forms of child labor continued.
In
practice child labor remained a problem, particularly in rural areas, where
two-thirds of the population resided. In rural areas children worked primarily
on family farms, in other agricultural activities and household
responsibilities, or in mines. In some cases they began work as young as age
six and were expected to do the work of adults by the time they reached age 15.
Especially during harvest and planting seasons, some parents did not permit
children to attend school.
Migration
from rural to urban settings exacerbated the child labor problem, because
unauthorized migrants were unable to register their households in urban areas.
Consequently, their children could not attend public schools, and families had
less access to credit. Officials stated that juveniles in education and
nourishment centers, which functioned similarly to reform schools or juvenile
detention centers, were commonly assigned work for “educational purposes.”
In
urban areas children worked in family-owned small businesses, including small,
privately owned garment factories, or on the street shining shoes or selling
articles such as lottery tickets and newspapers. For example, in September
Ministry of Public Security officials initiated the rescue of 19 ethnic
minority children from Dien Bien Province who had been trafficked for the
purpose of forced labor to family-owned garment workshops near Ho Chi Minh
City. One shelter reported that some children were drugged during the year to
keep them awake and working longer hours.
d. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The
law requires the government to set a minimum wage and adjust it based on
consumer price index changes. New minimum wages took effect on October 1, as
follows: the monthly minimum for unskilled laborers at private enterprises was
between VND 1.78 million (approximately $85) and VND 2 million ($95) in urban
areas, and VND 1.4 million ($67) and 1.55 million ($74) in rural areas. For
employees working for the state sector, the monthly minimum was VND 830,000
($40). The government defined the poverty line for the period 2011-15 as VND
400,000 ($19) per month for rural households and VND 500,000 ($24) for urban
households.
The
government set the workweek for government employees and employees of companies
in the state sector at 40 hours and encouraged the private business sector and
foreign and international organizations that employed local workers to reduce
the number of hours in the workweek to 40 hours, but it did not make compliance
mandatory.
The
law sets normal working hours at eight hours per day, with a mandatory 24-hour
break each week. Additional hours require overtime pay at one-and-one-half
times the regular wage, two times the regular wage for weekdays off, and three
times the regular wage for holidays and paid leave days. The law limits
compulsory overtime to 16 hours per week and 200 hours per year but provides
for an exception in special cases, with a maximum of 300 overtime hours worked
annually, subject to stipulation by the government after consulting with VGCL
and employer representatives. The law also prescribes annual leave with full
pay for the public and private sectors.
The
law requires the government to promulgate rules and regulations that provide
for worker safety and provides that workers may remove themselves from
hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
By
law a female employee who is engaged to be married, pregnant, on maternity
leave, or caring for a child under one year of age may not be dismissed unless
the enterprise closes. Female employees who are at least seven months’ pregnant
or are caring for a child under one year of age may not be compelled to work
overtime, at night, or in locations distant from their homes.
It
was unclear how strictly the government enforced provisions for wages, hours,
and benefits or the exceptions for certain female employees. MOLISA, in
coordination with local people’s committees and labor unions, is charged with
enforcing the law, but enforcement was inadequate for many reasons, including
low funding and a shortage of trained enforcement personnel. The VGCL asserted
that authorities did not always prosecute violations. MOLISA acknowledged
shortcomings in its labor inspection system, emphasizing that the country had
an insufficient number of labor inspectors. There were approximately 140
general labor inspectors plus small numbers of additional inspectors focused on
persons with disabilities, social insurance, export recruiting companies, etc.
The VGCL stated, and MOLISA acknowledged, that low fines on firms for labor
violations failed to act as an effective deterrent against violations.
There
were credible reports that factories exceeded the legal overtime thresholds and
did not meet legal requirements for rest days. A September ILO report noted
that 66 of 78 apparel factories did not comply with legal overtime limits.
On-the-job
injuries due to poor health and safety conditions and inadequate employee
training in the workplace remained a problem. The mining and construction
sectors reported the greatest number of occupational injuries. In the first six
months of the year, there were 3,531 occupational accidents and 273 deaths. For
example, in April a stone mining accident killed 18 workers in Nghe An
Province. The company had been fined twice in the previous year for poor safety
standards, and authorities arrested the owner after the April incident for
violating safety regulations. At year’s end prosecution proceedings had begun
against the owner.
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